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Abstract
One of the most important requirements for accurate causal
inference  is  that  there  be  no  confounds;  the  cause  being
evaluated  must  occur  independently  of  all  other  causes.
When this requirement is not met, causal inferences are likely
to be incorrect.  The current study asks participants to judge
how  informative  various  situations  are  with  respect  to
drawing causal inferences.  Contrary to normative principles,
participants  appear  to  believe  that  many  confounded
situations are just as informative as unconfounded situations.
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Introduction
To  evaluate  the  causal  influence  of  a  given  factor,
experiments often use two groups: the experimental group
that includes the factor of interest and the control group that
does not.   For example, a doctor who wants to test the
efficacy  of  a  new  medication  would  give  one  group  of
patients  the  new  medication  and  give  another  group  of
patients a placebo.   The principles of experimental design
mandate that these two groups ideally be identical in all
respects except for the factor of interest (e.g. medication).  If
the  two  groups  also  differ  in  some  other  respect  (e.g.
gender), the experiment is said to be confounded.
Confounded situations make causal inferences difficult.
Imagine  that  the  results  of  our  medication  study
demonstrated a significant outcome; the experimental group
experienced fewer symptoms than the control group.   Can
we  make  conclusions  about  the  effect  of  the  new
medication?  The difference in symptoms may be because of
the new medication.  However, the difference in symptoms
may  also  have  been  due  to  the  unintended  difference
between groups (e.g. gender).   How do we differentiate
between  these  two  alternatives?   What  is  the  correct
inferential strategy in such situations?
Recognizing  and  dealing  with  the  implications  of
confounds  is  part  of  life  for  seasoned  experimentalists.
However, lay reasoners must deal with similar quandaries
when attempting to evaluate causes in everyday life.  In fact,
because  people  must  typically  rely  on  non-experimental
observations, they are actually in a disadvantaged inferential
position.   It is currently unclear how and how well people
deal with confounds in everyday reasoning.   The current
study aims to evaluate how confounded situations influence
people’s causal judgments.
Models of Causal Inference
In experimental design, confounds are typically described as
an  unintended  difference  between  the  experimental  and
control groups (as in the example above).  More formally, a
confound occurs when the cause of interest, C, and some
alternative  cause,  A,  occur  in  a  statistically  dependent
manner (i.e., P(A|C) ≠ P(A|~C) where the tilde indicates
absence)
1.   As will be shown, independence is a general
requirement for valid causal inference.
Early  models  of  causal  inference  made  no  special
allowances for confounded situations.   For example, DP
(Jenkins & Ward, 1965) computes the causal influence of C
on an effect, E, according to the following equation:
DP = P(E|C) – P(E|~C) (1)
Thus, DP compares the probability of E in the presence C
with  the  probability  of  E  in  the  absence  of  C.   When
Equation 1 is significantly positive, C is judged to cause E.
The computation suggested by DP does not differentiate
between confounded and unconfounded situations; Equation
1 is used in all situations.   This is problematic because
violations of independence can lead to erroneous causal
inferences.  For example, imagine that an alternative cause,
A, has a significant influence on E and occurs more often
when C is present than when it C is absent.  P(E|C) will be
large, not because of C’s influence, but because of A’s
influence.   The resulting DP will be significantly positive
even when C has no influence.  Thus, reasoners who use DP
to  evaluate  causal  influence  can  make  erroneous  causal
inferences.
Fortunately, people’s behavior does not conform to these
predictions.  For example, Spellman (1996) had participants
observe an experiment in which two causes (a red and a blue
liquid) were administered to various plants to see if they
affected  blooming.   Participants  received  a  set  of
observations, each of which described a specific plant.  Each
observation specified whether that plant received the red
liquid, whether it received the blue liquid, and whether it
bloomed.   Some  of  the  plant  experiments  were
unconfounded;  the  two  liquids  were  administered
independently  of  each  other.   Other  situations  were
confounded; independence was violated.  Participants were
then asked to evaluate the causal influence of one of the
liquids.
When the situation preserved independence, participants’
judgments  matched  the  predictions  of  DP.   When  the
                                                            
1 Greenland, Robins, & Pearl (1999) refer to situations that violate
independence as non-collapsible.  For clarity, I will refer to such
situations as confounds or violations of independence.situation  violated  independence,  participants’  judgments
deviated from DP.   Participants appeared to recognize the
confounded situations as such and adjust their reasoning
accordingly.   In these situations, participants’ judgments
suggest that they applied Equation 1, not to the entire set of
data  as  DP  suggests,  but  to  a  subset  of  the  presented
observations.  Furthermore, participants did not simply use
arbitrary subsets; the subsets used were those in which the
two causes were independent of each other (generally using
the observations in which the alternative cause was absent).
That  is,  because  the  entire  set  of  observations  violated
independence, participants used a subset of data in which
independence was preserved.  Spellman (1996) refers to this
operation  as  conditionalizing  and  argues  that  such
judgments are normative.  In terms of avoiding problematic
confounds,  conditionalizing  certainly  appears  to  be
normative  since  it  establishes  independence  and  thus
permits valid causal inferences.
Thus,  the  suggestions  of  Spellman  (1996)  appear  to
render the problem of confounds moot.  All that is needed is
a  focal  set  in  which  independence  is  satisfied  and  the
problem of confounds disappears.   However, imagine that
our medication study is in fact confounded (e.g. more males
in the experimental condition than in the control condition)
but we have no record of our patients’ genders.  How do we
construct  a  focal  set  in  which  medication-gender
independence is guaranteed?   It is unclear how one would
guarantee independence in any given focal subset without
information  about  the  presence/absence  of  alternative
causes.   What are reasoners to do?   Conditionalizing can’t
help when the alternative cause is unobserved because we
cannot test for independence in any subset of observations.
Because of this, even reasoners who wish to conditionalize
cannot be guaranteed to make correct inferences.
This difficulty has lead researchers to begin describing the
conditions required for normative (i.e., infallible) evaluation
of causal influence.  Inferential errors can then be evaluated
with respect to these conditions and ultimate allow a more
detailed understanding of people’s behavior.  For example,
Cheng’s (1997) power PC theory (PPC), relates DP to a
normative  quantity  called  causal  power.   When
independence is violated, causal power cannot be accurately
computed.  Pearl (2000) derives a slightly different quantity
(called PS) that also requires independence.
Given these analyses, what is the appropriate inference to
make when confronted with unobserved alternative causes
that violate independence?  Though PPC and PS suggest the
need  for  independence,  neither  prescribes  measures  to
actually attain independence.  Thus, one reasonable strategy
might be to avoid making strong inferences at all.  Given the
uncertainty such situations create, it might be better to wait
for additional information.  If pressed to make a judgment,
reasoners should certainly do so with little or no confidence.
Given  people’s  sensitivity  to  observable  violations  of
independence, perhaps they will be equally astute when
faced with these more uncertain situations.  What little work
has been done on such situations (Perales, Cheng, & Catena,
2001, April; 2001, September) suggests that reasoners may
be sensitive to unobserved confounds.
Participants  in  the  Perales,  et  al.  study  were  given
information about how two causes varied with each other.
The relationship between the two causes either preserved or
violated  independence.   Participants  were  then  given
information about how the effect varied with one of the two
causes (the target cause).  The other cause was hidden from
view, preventing participants from conditionalizing.  In one
condition, effect varied with the target cause perfectly (DP =
1.0).   I refer to this as the Deterministic condition.   In the
other condition, the effect varied only moderately with the
effect  (DP  =  .66).   I  refer  to  this  as  the  Probabilistic
condition.  Participants were then asked how informative the
entire situation was with respect to evaluating the strength
of  the  target  cause.   Participants  rated  unconfounded
situations  as  significantly  more  informative  than
confounded  situations.   These  findings  suggest  that
reasoners  are  generally  concerned  with  violations  of
independence and recognize the inferential dilemma they
entail.
This study leaves many questions unanswered, however.
For example, the Deterministic condition creates special
circumstances for confounds.   Contrary to the normative
analyses, when the effect always and only follows the target
cause, confounds do not generally prevent causal inferences.
It is only when the target and alternative causes correlate
perfectly that inferences are prevented (see below for a more
detailed  explanation).   This  suggests  that  participants’
judgments  in  the  Deterministic  condition  may  not
necessarily generalize to other confounded situations.
This realization points to a more general problem.   The
two  causes  in  Perales’ study confounded situation were
perfectly  correlated  (i.e.,  P(C|A)=1,  P(C|~A)=0).   This
condition provides a rather weak test of how confounds
influence  causal  inferences.   When  the  two  causes  are
perfectly correlated, causal inferences about one cause (but
not the other) are clearly impossible.   It is unclear how
reasoners  might  deal  with  less  extreme  violations  of
independence.  It certainly seems possible that Perales’s, et
al. participants could have judged the confounded condition
as  uninformative  because  of  the  extreme  nature  of  the
violations used in the study.   Violations of independence
may  be  of  less  concern  to  people  if  the  two  causes
sometimes occur separately.   The case where causes are
perfectly correlated may actually be a particularly salient
confound and thus Perales’ et al. findings may overestimate
people’s competence.
To  clarify  how  violations  of  independence  influence
people’s causal inferences, the current study uses a more
fine-grained  manipulation  of  independence.   Instead  of
using only extreme violations of independence, the current
study  uses  a  spectrum  of  violations  to  better  evaluate
people’s general ability to detect and deal with them.
Experiment
The current experiment consisted of three phases.   In the
first phase, participants were given information about how
two causes, C and A, varied with each other.  In the second
phase, participants were given information about how thetarget cause, C, varied with the effect, E.  In the third phase,
participants  were  asked  to  make  various  judgments
including the extent to which the information in the first two
phases permitted causal inferences.
To  systematically  vary  the  independence  of  the  two
causes, the current study manipulates the difference between
P(A|C) from P(A|~C) (varying from 0.0 to 1.0, see Figure
1).   The only condition that preserves independence is the
0.0  condition  where  P(A|C)  equals  P(A|~C).   All  other
conditions violate independence.
Like Perales, et al., the current study also manipulated the
strength  of  the  cause-effect  relationship.   In  the
Deterministic condition, the relationship between C and E
was  characterized  by  a  DP  of  1.0,  C  and  E  correlated
perfectly.   In the Probabilistic condition, the relationship
between C and E was characterized by a DP of .75.
 The Probabilistic condition provides a good test of how
people  deal  with  confounds  because  any  violation  of
independence prevents valid causal inference.  According to
the normative analysis, the 0.0 condition should be rated as
highly  informative  because  it  preserves  independence
between  the  causes.   The  other  conditions  violate
independence and are thus uninformative according to the
normative analysis (see Fig. 2).
Normatively, the Deterministic condition should show a
different  pattern.   The  1.0  condition  should  be  rated  as
uninformative because the two causes are inseparable.  All
other conditions should be rated as informative because,
regardless of independence, they allow valid inferences (see
Fig. 2).
 The Deterministic condition is unique because violations
of independence do not generally prevent accurate causal
inferences.   It  is  possible  to  correctly  disentangle  the
influence of  the  two  causes.   Take  the  Deterministic .5
condition.   The alternative cause occurs in the absence of
the target cause four times.   On these four occasions the
effect never occurs (the effect never occurs when the target
cause is absent).   This suggests that the alternative cause
does not cause the effect.  Conversely, the target cause and
effect  occur  together  on  16  occasions.   On  12  of  those
occasions the alternative cause will also be present.   To
isolate the target cause, only the remaining four occasions
must be used.  Because all 16 occasions are identical (C and
E both occur), it makes no difference which four occasions
are used and which 12 are ignored.   The target cause is
always followed by the effect, suggesting that the presence
of the target cause always causes the effect.
Figure  2  summarizes  the  normative  pattern  of
informativeness for each condition.   As can be seen, the
patterns  of  informativeness  are  quite  different  for  the
Probabilistic  and  Deterministic  conditions.   In  the
Probabilistic  condition,  the  0.0  condition  should  be
informative and all other conditions should uninformative.
In the Deterministic condition, the 1.0 condition should be
uninformative  and  all  other  conditions  should  be
informative.
Of course, to mimic these normative patterns, people must
be rather astute reasoners.   They must first recognize how
violations  of  independence  impair  causal  reasoning.
Furthermore,  they  must  realize  that  the  Deterministic
condition presents a unique situation in which violations of
independence do not always prevent valid conclusions.
In  contrast,  I  would  suggest  that  people  might  not
recognize  the  inferential  problems  associated  with
“moderate” violations of independence (conditions, .25, .5,
and .75).   Furthermore, the analysis required to recognize
the  Deterministic  condition  as  special  may  be  too
sophisticated for typical reasoners.   Taken together, these
possibilities  suggest  that  the  1.0  condition  should  be
consistently rated as less informative than other conditions.
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Figure 1 - The five conditions used in the current study.  The frist row illustrates how the two causes, C and A, vary with 
each other.  The next two rows contain conditional probabilities computed from the first row.  The bottom row contains the 
difference between the two conditional probabilities
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Figure 2 - Normative estimates of informativeness.  In the 
Probabilistic condition, the 0.0 condition should be more informative 
than all other conditions.  In the Deterministic Condition, the 1.0 
condition should be less informative than all other conditions.Method
Fifty participants were told that they would be viewing the
results from several drug trials.  Each drug trial utilized two
medications  and  recorded  information  about  any  side
effects.  The participants were told that they were going to
be asked to evaluate the extent to which one of the drugs
(the target drug) caused side effects.  Half of the participants
were assigned to the Deterministic condition and half were
assigned to the Probabilistic condition.   All participants
received  the  five  conditions  illustrated  in  Figure  1  in
pseudorandom order.
Each  drug  trial  consisted  of  two  sets  of  information
presented on a computer.  The first screen was intended to
convey  information  about  the  correlation  between  two
potential causes. This screen displayed 32 patients along
with information about which of the two medications each
received.  No information about side effects was available at
this point.  How the two medications were distributed to the
32 patients is described in Figure 1, where A and C each
denote  a  medication.   After  reviewing  this  information,
participants moved on to the second screen.   The second
screen provided information about the target drug and the
side effects for the same 32 patients.  No information about
the other drug was available at this point.   Additionally,
patients were shuffled between the first and second screen to
prevent participants from simply matching the two sets of
information.  Participants were also given printed copies of
all experimental information for reference.
After  viewing  these  two  screens  of  information,
participants were asked a set of questions.   To ensure that
the  independence  manipulation  was  effective  and
noticeable, participants were asked to estimate P(A|C) as
well as P(A|~C) in terms of frequency (e.g Sixteen patients
received drug A, of those sixteen, how many also received
drug  B?).   If  these  estimates  were  accurate,  subsequent
results cannot be attributed to participants’ ignorance of
independence.  Most importantly, participants were asked to
judge whether the information provided allowed them to
judge the extent to which the target drug (by itself) caused
the side effects (0-Definitely Not to 10-Definitley Yes); the
same judgment elicited by Perales, et al.    Participants were
also separately asked to actually judge the strength of the
target cause.
Empirical Results
 A 2 (Deterministic vs. Probabilistic) by 5 (0.0, .25, .5, .75,
1.0) ANOVA was performed with repeated measures on the
latter  factor.   The  main  effects  of  both  factors  were
significant  (F(1,  47)=18.60,  p<.0001;  F(4,  188)=37.42,
p<.0001, respectively)
2 as was the interaction between them
(F(4, 188)=5.07, p<.001).  For clarity, the Deterministic and
Probabilistic conditions will be further analyzed separately.
Before moving on, however, it is important to ensure that
the  violations  of  independence  were  noticeable  to
participants.  To do so, participants’ estimates of P(A|C) and
P(A|~C)  were  compared  to  the  actual  conditional
probabilities.   Not surprisingly, frequency estimates were
very accurate.  No single estimate differed from the correct
frequency by more than 1.  Because of this, the correlation
between mean estimates and true conditional frequencies
was greater than .99, p < .0001.   This finding allows for
significantly cleaner interpretation of subsequent findings.
Deterministic Condition
Figure  3  presents  participants  judgments  of
informativeness.   As can be see, judgments matched the
normative predictions.  When the two causes were perfectly
correlated (the 1.0 condition), participants rated the situation
as less informative than in the 0.0 condition (t(24)=10.48, p
< .0001), the .25 condition (t(23)=9.71, p < .0001), the .5
condition (t(24)=8.64) , p < .0001, and the .75 condition
(t(24)=6.96, p < .0001).   In addition, the .75 was rated as
significantly  less  informative  than  the  0.0  condition
(t(24)=2.34, p<.05).   No other significant differences were
found.
Figure 4 displays participants’ causal judgments of the
target cause.   Causal ratings of the target cause mirrored
participants’ informativeness ratings.  The target cause was
rated as weaker in the 1.0 condition than in any of the other
conditions (all p’s<.001).   No other significant differences
were found.
Probabilistic Condition
It is interesting to note that informativeness ratings were
lower  for  the  Probabilistic  condition  than  for  the
Deterministic  condition.   This  suggests  that  participants
believe  probabilistic  situations  to  be  inherently  less
informative than deterministic situations.   Such a belief is
not predicted by normative analyses.   According to these
accounts,  probabilistic  data  is  just  as  informative  as
deterministic data.   Participants, on the other hand, may
believe  that  causes  are  naturally  deterministic  and  that
apparently probabilistic relationships result from “noise.”
The pattern of participants’ informativenss judgments in
the Probabilistic condition also did not match the normative
predictions.  Instead, participants’ judgments were similar to
                                                            
2 Some participants chose not to respond to some of the queries.
The variable degrees of freedom in the following analyses reflect
this fact.
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Figure 3 - Participants ratings of how informative each 
condition was.  Error bars indicate standard error.those in the Deterministic condition though lower overall
(see  Figure  3).   As  in  the  Deterministic  condition,
preservation of independence (the 0.0 condition) lead to
participants  to  judge  the  situation  as  significantly  more
informative  than  when  the  two  causes  were  perfectly
correlated  (M=4.54  and  1.52  respectively,  t(24)=3.71,
p<.005).   Contrary  to  the  normative  prediction,  the
remaining conditions (.25, .5, and .75) were all rated as
significantly  more  informative  than  the  1.0  condition
(t(24)=4.29, t(24)=3.65, and t(24)=3.51 respectively; all p’s
< .01).  No other significant differences were found.
Participants’ causal judgments are displayed in Figure 4.
The overall pattern is somewhat different than that of the
Deterministic  condition.   The  perceived  strength  of  the
target  cause  declined  steadily  as  P(A|C)  and  P(A|~C)
diverged, reaching a minimum in the .75 condition.   The
target cause in the .5 condition was judged to be marginally
weaker  than  the  target  cause  in  the  0.0  condition
(t(23)=1.71, p=.1).   The target cause in the .75 condition
was rated as weaker than the target cause in the .5 condition
(t(23)=3.24, p<.01).
Summary When the two causes were perfectly correlated
(the  1.0  condition),  participants  rated  the  situation  as
uninformative.   Participants  rated  all  other  situations  as
significantly more informative.   This was the case in both
the  Deterministic  condition  (where  such  judgments  are
accurate) as well as in the Probabilistic condition (where
such judgments are inaccurate).   Instead of believing that
violations  of  independence  prohibit  causal  inferences,
participants appeared to believe that only complete overlap
between the two causes prevented inferences.
Analytical Results
Participants’ inappropriate beliefs about the informativeness
of confounded situations could obviously lead to erroneous
causal inferences.  However it would be more compelling to
actually  assess  accuracy  instead  of  contemplating
hypothetical  possibilities.   How  appropriate  were
participants’ causal strength judgments?
To help answer this question, I computed the maximum
likelihood estimate (MLE) of the strength of both the target
and alternative causes.   Unlike other measures of causal
influence (e.g. Cheng, 1997; Pearl, 2000), the MLE does not
compute infallible estimates of causal influence.   Instead,
the  MLE  provides  the  “best  guess”  estimate  of  causal
influence, which may turn out to be incorrect.
The current design withholds two important quantities
from participants (i.e., the causal strength of the target cause
and  the  causal  strength  of  the  alternative  cause).   It  is
possible to compute the likelihood with which each possible
combination  of  values  for  these  two  quantities  would
produce the observed data.   The most likely pair is then
deemed to be the MLE.   For this analysis, I assume that
there  are  only  two  generative  causes  (the  target  and
alternative cause) and that they combine their influence in
accordance  with  the  rules  of  a  noisy-or  gate  (Glymour,
1998).  The resulting parameters characterize the degree to
which each cause is sufficient to bring about the effect
(similar in this respect to Cheng, 1997 and Pearl, 2000).
The estimated strengths for the target cause are shown in
Figure 5.  As discussed above, the Deterministic condition
allows for valid inferences.   Thus, it is not surprising that
the estimates match people’s causal judgments quite well in
the Deterministic condition.  The estimated causal strength
of the target cause was maximal (1.0) in all but the 1.0
condition.   The 1.0 condition creates an ambiguity.   The
observed data could have result when either  of  the  two
causes  is  maximally  sufficient,  regardless  of  the  other
cause’s strength.   This ambiguity may explain why people
believed the 1.0 condition to be highly uninformative and
the associated drop in their causal judgment.
Causal judgments in the Probabilistic condition were also
similar to the MLE.  The computed estimates of the target
cause’s strength steadily decreased as P(A|C) and P(A|~C)
diverged, eventually reaching a minimum of zero in the .75
condition.   Participants’  causal  judgments  demonstrated
approximately  the  same  pattern.   Judgments  in  the  .5
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Figure 4 - Participants' causal strength ratings.  Causal strength 
could range from 0 to 10.  Error bars indicate standard error.
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Figure 5 - MLE for strength of the target cause. 
Estimates of causal strength could range from 0 to 1.condition  were  less  than  those  in  the  0.0  condition  and
judgments in the .75 condition were lower than those in the
.5 condition.  It is unclear whether the causal judgments in
the  .75  condition  can  be  treated  as  minimal  (M=3.84),
though nearly a third of participants gave a causal rating of
zero, making it the modal response.   The MLE is again
undefined  in  the  1.0  condition,  this  time  because  no
combination of causal strengths will result in the observed
data.
  Summary In  the  Deterministic  condition,  participants’
causal judgments were highly accurate.   This is probably
due to the fact that confounding in this condition does not
cause the typical difficulties.  In the Probabilistic condition,
causal judgments were reasonable though fallible.  Indeed,
as the difference between P(A|C) and P(A|~C) increases in
the  Probabilistic  condition,  the  likelihood  of  the  MLE
actually  being  correct  diminishes  rapidly.   Nonetheless,
people’s judgments were quite close to the “best guess”
values of the MLE.
Discussion
The results of the current study suggest that confounds do
not necessarily have the impact on people’s reasoning that
they should.   Confounds (i.e., violations of independence)
generally limit the ability to make valid causal inferences.
However,  when  asked  to  rate  how  informative  various
experimental situations were, participants’ ratings appeared
to  be  insensitive  to  the  presence  of  confounds.   This
ignorance,  could  certainly  lead  to  erroneous  causal
inferences in a variety of everyday situations.
Despite  their  erroneous  judgments  of  informativeness,
participants appear to have made rather reasonable causal
strength  judgments.   This  finding,  however,  does  not
diminish the error people make by ignoring violations of
independence.   Though the MLE provides the single most
probable estimate, it is highly likely to be incorrect in the
confounded  situations  (at  least  in  the  Probabilistic
condition).   An ideal reasoner would be able to recognize
confounds  as  inferential  obstacles  as  well  as  make
reasonable  causal  strength  judgments.   Doing  so  would
allow  the  good  causal  judgments  without  unwarranted
confidence.
Why did participants incorrectly believe the confounded
situations to be so informative?  It is plausible that the full
impact  of  confounded  situations  is  not  a  completely
integrated part of people’s causal reasoning repertoire.  As
reviewed above, people do seem to control for alternative
causes when they are observable.   However, such findings
may  overestimate  people’s  competence  because  the
presence of a salient alternative cause may act as a reminder
of  the  potential  ambiguity  interpretation  must  face.   In
everyday situations, where situations are assuredly messier,
reminders of the inferential danger may not be as obvious.
In addition, when faced with an effect that clearly varies
with  a  salient  potential  cause  (as  in  the  current  study),
people may often be tempted to jump to causal conclusions
without consulting alternative explanations.  Such a lack of
critical  analysis  would  explain  a  variety  of  erroneous
beliefs.   Superstitions  are  one  obvious  example.  People
often hold beliefs about the causal influence of obviously
irrelevant  actions  (e.g.  wearing  a  particular  article  of
clothing causing a favorite sports team to win).  These same
people may also be able to acknowledge that alternative
explanations exist for the desired outcome when pushed to
do so.  Similarly, I would speculate that at least some of the
participants in the current study would acknowledge the
uncertainty inherent in the experiment if it were pointed out
to them.  This discrepancy may suggest tension between two
modes of reasoning: an automatic mode that is stimulated
by  the  compelling  cause-effect  covariation  and  a  more
deliberate mode that may be able to resist such temptation
(see Kahneman, 2003).
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